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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
AN ACT TO AMEND THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT IN RELATION TO
THE REVIVAL OF CLAIMS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
- Statutes of limitation have reference to the periods of time within
which actions or proceedings in law or equity must be brought, and
which on a failure to do so establish a legal presumption that the
obligation involved had been paid or discharged,' and in the case of
realty that a conveyance had been executed, but lost.2 It is designed
not merely to raise a presumption 3 of payment of a just debt from
lapse of time, but to afford security against stale demands after the
true state of the transaction may have been forgotten or has become
incapable of explanation by reason of the death or removal of wit-
nesses.
4
Although it is said that by the common law there were no lim-
itations of actions, nevertheless, pleas of limitation were allowed long
before there was any statute on the subject, and limitations of time
in criminal and real actions had existed for centuries.5 Thus, con-
tinued adverse possession of real property for a substantial period
of time precluded the owner from regaining his land from the pos-
sessor. But the common law concept of a limitation of time within
which an action must be commenced is entirely distinct from the
statutes of limitation as they exist today.6 "The statutes of limitation
. . . are founded in public needs and public policy-are arbitrary en-
actments by the law-making power." 7 It is generally held that the
operation of the statute goes only to the remedy,8 and does not act
to extinguish the right, with an apparent exception noted with respect
to specific real and personal property to be hereinafter discussed.
" See 2 .CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 761 (8th ed. Carrington
1927).2 See Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks, 119 Ky. 261, 83 S. W. 615,
616 (1904).
3 Originally, a statute of limitation was regarded as one of repose and not
one of presumption. Subsequently the opposite view was taken by the courts;
but the view which seems to prevail today is to the effect that it is a statute of
repose, the object of which is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from
springing up at great distances of time, and surprising the parties or their
representatives, when all the proper vouchers and evidence are lost, or the
facts have become obscure from the lapse of time, or the defective memory or
death or removal of witnesses. See 17 R. C. L. 664 (1917).
4 Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 360 (U. S. 1828).
5 For some procedural aspects of the statute of limitations and its early
common law application and progression, see Atkinson, Some Procedural
Aspects of the Statute of Limitations, 27 COL. L. REv. 157 (1927).
6 Ibid. By the common law there was no fixed time for the bringing of
actions. People v. Gilbert, 18 Johns. 227 (N. Y. 1820). In tort actions, the
cause of action abated on the death of either party. This theory of abatement
did not extend to actions ex contractit. Limitations are created solely by
statute, and derive their authority therefrom. They are legislative and not
judicial acts. See Barnhardt v. Morrison, 178 N. C. 563, 568, 101 S. E. 218,
221 (1919).
7 Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 628 (1885).
8 Smith v. Turner, 91 N. H. 198, 17 A. 2d 87 (1940) ; Evans v. Finley, 166
Ore. 227, 111 P. 2d 833 (1941).
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The plea of the statute is not compulsory, being a personal privilege
of which a party may avail himself or not as he pleases.9
It may be said that statutes of limitation are presumed to be
prospective and not retrospective in their operation, in the absence
of a clear legislative intent to the contrary, and the presumption is
against any intent on the part of the legislature to make such a statute
retroactive.' 0
But supposing that the legislature does enact legislation which
is in terms retroactive, and such a statute removes the bar of the
limitation statute which otherwise would have been a complete de-
fense, is this an unconstitutional deprivation of property within the
purview of the Fourteenth Amendment "- to the Constitution of the
United States?
That is the problem to be here considered.
The Leading Case
The leading case on this branch of the subject is Campbell v.
Holt,'2 wherein the plaintiff sued for the violation of an implied con-
tract to pay money. The cause of action arose prior to the outbreak
of the Civil War. The Texas legislature suspended the operation of
the statutes of limitation during the war, but thereafter renewed their
operation. Subsequent to the time allotted to the plaintiff to com-
mence suit, a new constitution was enacted which contained a saving
clause for causes of action such as the plaintiff's. Thereupon plain-
tiff commenced suit. The defendant insisted that the bar of the
statute being complete, it could not be taken away; and that to do so
would violate that part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States which declares that no state shall "...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .. 
The Court made a distinction in principle between suits involv-
ing the recovery of tangible property, real and personal, and those in
which an in personam claim is made,' 3 and held ". . . that, in an
action to recover real or personal property, where the question is as
to the removal of the bar of the statute of limitations by a legislative
act passed after the bar has become perfect, such act deprives the
party of his property without due process of law. The reason is,
0 Sanger v. Nightingale, 122 U. S. 176 (1887).
10 Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co., 233 N. Y. 213, 135 N. E. 267 (1922).
See 17 R. C. L. 682 (1917).
11 U. S. CoNsT. AmEN'D. XIV, § 1, the material provision of which states
that, "... No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ..
2115 U. S. 620 (1885).
13 The court predicated this distinction on the doctrine of prescription, the
latter having its origin in the old English law. This distinction was disap-
proved in Bussey v. Bishop, 169 Ga. 251, 150 S. E. 78 (1929).
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that by the law in existence before the repealing act, the property
had become the defendant's. Both the legal title and the real owner-
ship had become vested in him, and to give the act the effect of
transferring this title to plaintiff, would be to deprive him of his
property without due process of law." 14 The Court then went on
to state that the legislature could remove the bar which the statute
of limitations attaches to an action on debt, contract, or tort, and
could do so arbitrarily. This conclusion was predicated on the prin-
ciples that (1) the legislature could arbitrarily enact and retract
statutes of limitation, (2) that such a statute does not extinguish the
debt or obligation involved, but merely precludes enforcement thereof,
and (3) that, although the right to bring an action was a property
interest, the right to defend a suit by interposing a statutory limita-
tion was not.
A strong dissenting opinion asserted, and with some logic, that
the word "property" as utilized in the constitutional sense, embraces
all valuable interests which a man may possess outside of himself ;
and that an immunity from suit is as valuable to the one party as the
right to prosecute the suit is to the other. 5
However, the majority view of this opinion has not been over-
ruled, and has been expressly followed by two subsequent Supreme
Court decisions. In Stewart v. Keyes, 6 an act of Congress was de-
clared unconstitutional which revived a claim for the recovery of an
interest in land barred by the running of the limitation therein ap-
plicable; and in a later case 17 involving the Minnesota Blue Sky
Law, resurrectionary legislation encompassing no tangible property
was held valid.' 8
It would seem that when the period prescribed by the statute
has once run, so as to abrogate the remedy which one might have
had for the recovery of property in the possession of another, title
14 115 U. S. 620, 623 (1885).
35 Id. at 630.
16295 U. S. 403 (1935). But cf. Danzer and Co. v. Gulf and Ship Island
R. R., 268 U. S. 633 (1925), where a distinction was pointed out between cases
where the limitation affects only the remedy and those which also go to the
liability.
17 Chase Securities Co. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304 (1945), where, in an
action for an amount paid for securities not registered under the Blue Sky Law
and where the state supreme court had held that the general statute of limita-
tions had not been tolled, and after resurrectionary legislation in effect limited
the bar of the statute, defendant was not thereby deprived of property without
due process.
18 But the reasoning of Campbell v. Holt has been thought not applicable
to claims arising out of statutes containing their own limitation, it being there
held that the limitation becomes part of the definition of the right, which is
extinguished along with the remedy when the action is barred, and which may
not be reinstated consistently with the requirements of due process. Danzer
and Co. v. Gulf and Ship Island R. R-, 268 U. S. 633 (1925) (Interstate Com-
merce Act); Link v. Seaboard Air Line R. R, 73 F. 2d 149 (4th Cir. 1934)




to the property is regarded in the law as vested in the possessor, who
is entitled to the same protection in respect to it as the owner is
entitled to in other cases. A subsequent repeal of the limitation law
could not be given a retroactive effect so as to disturb this title. It
is vested completely and perfectly. Any attempted revival of the
claim of the original owner would be confiscatory in character and,
therefore, unconstitutional as an unlawful deprivation of property.
It would be well to note that in such a case, the statute affects the
res or claim itself, and not merely the remedy; that is, it actually
transfers title to the interest involved. It is submitted that in such
a situation, the statute of limitation operates to absolutely extinguish
the claim of the original owner, and is not remedial in nature, but
rather substantive or in rem.
But when the Court declares that the prerogative to bar the en-
forcement of a claim through the interposition of the statute of lim-
itations is not a property interest, albeit the claim itself is a vested
interest safeguarded by the Constitution, the Court's reasoning would
seem to be predicated upon a fallacious premise; that premise being
the connotation of "property" as set forth in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The meaning of property in the various ramifications of its ap-
plication is and has been one of the most perplexing problems of
constitutional law. But "property" in its commonly accepted legal
sense is no longer an exclusively physical concept. It encompasses
all the rights, powers, privileges and immunities arising from posses-
sion, ownership or claim to some valuable interest. It would seem
therefore, that the Court's distinction between the statute barring
only the remedy and not the right is paralogical legal fiction, designed
to sanction the view that the defense of the statute of limitations is
not a property interest. Certainly a right is of no value if there is
no remedy to enforce it. Right and remedy are necessarily correla-
tive and self-complementary. Surely if the right to litigate a claim
is property, and if the withdrawing of the remedy to sue on that
claim would be unconstitutional, it follows that the option to preclude
the enforcement of that claim is, if not just as valuable, at least some
form of property interest within the purview of the Federal Consti-
tution.
The view that the defense of the statute of limitations is a pro-
prietary interest has been followed by a majority of jurisdictions in
this country.
The General View
There is a divergence of judicial opinion as to whether the
legislature may remove a statutory bar to a cause of action on a
personal demand where the bar has already become complete. There
is no dissent from the doctrine that the bar cannot be removed where
a title has been acquired through the operation of the statute of lim-
itations. In most jurisdictions the general rule is laid down, without
19501]
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exception or qualification, that the legislature cannot remove a statu-
tory bar to a cause of action that has already matured.19 In a few
jurisdictions the distinction between a statutory bar operating to
invest persons with title to property and a bar which constitutes
merely a defense to a personal demand, initially presented in Camp-
bell v. Holt, is followed.2 0  The New York law on this subject, to
be hereinafter reviewed, would seem to affirm neither the Supreme
Court nor the majority rule, but expounds a conciliatory view in that
it avoids the hardship of the majority rule and ignores the apparent
mathematical logic of the Supreme Court, by declaring that the
validity of resurrectionary legislation depends solely on its reason-
ableness, as applied to the particular set of circumstances before the
court.
A number of cases contain general statements to the effect that
the legislature cannot remove a bar of limitations which has become
complete, the basis of this conclusion being that ". . . the statute of
limitation is a rule of property." 21 Thus, an Arkansas court com-
mented, " '. . . after a cause of action has become barred by the statute
of limitations, the defendant has a vested right to rely on that statute
as a defense, and neither a constitutional convention nor the Legis-
lature has power to divest that right and revive the cause of
action.' "22 In some jurisdictions the running of the statute of limi-
tations absolutely extinguishes the cause of action, it being considered
a right as well as a remedy.23
However, the better view would seem to be that the statute of
limitations encompasses merely procedural characteristics, and the
bar created by its having run precludes the remedy, and does not
act to extinguish or destroy the claim itself.2 4 This would seem to
be conclusively established by the fact that unless the statute is af-
firmatively interposed in defense, its benefit is presumed waived, and
the court will thereupon proceed to judgment upon the merits.25
Were it true that the cause of action was completely nullified by the
running of the statute, the court would be unable to litigate a claim
" Wasson v. State ex rel. Jackson, 187 Ark. 537, 60 S. W. 2d 1020 (1933) ;
Bussey v. Bishop, 169 Ga. 251, 150 S. E. 78 (1929) ; McCutcheon & Church v.
Smith, 111 Tex. 554, 242 S. W. 454 (1922); see Raymer v. Comley Lumber
Co., 169 Okla. 576, 38 P. 2d 8, 14 (1934); Cathey v. Weaver, 111 Tex. 515,
242 S. W. 447, 453 (1922).
20 See Berkin v. Healy, 52 Mont. 398, 158 Pac. 1020 (1916).
21 Raymer v. Comley Lumber Co., 169 Okla. 576, 38 P. 2d 8, 14 (1934).
22 Wasson v. State, 187 Ark. 537, 60 S. W. 2d 1020 (1933), quoting from
6 R. C. L. 309 (1915); accord, McCutcheon & Church v. Smith, 111 Tex. 554,
242 S. W. 454 (1922).
23 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 14 N. W. 2d 177 (1944).
24 King v. Solomon, 323 Mass. 326, 81 N. E. 2d 838 (1948); Johnson v.
Railroad Co., 54 N. Y. 416 (1873). See Baker v. Cohn, 266 App. Div. 236,
41 N. Y. S. 2d 765 (1st Dep't 1943). See Note, 164 A. L. R. 1387 (1946).
25 To the effect that the statute of limitations does not nullify a debt, but
merely prevents enforcement of recovery, see Note, 8 A. L. R. 2d 640 (1949).
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which was in law a nullity.2 6 The reasoning heretofore described
does not apply to a situation where title to property passes to another
upon the running of the statute; and this because the defendant in
such a case really sets up superior title derived from the statute of
limitations, and not the statute itself.
2 7
In Massachusetts the general rule seemed to be against the power
of the legislature to remove the bar of the statute of limitations until
the case of Danforth v. Groton Water Company 28 was decided. In
that decision the court in a very hard case declined to hold uncon-
stitutional a statute authorizing petitions for a jury to assess damages
for the taking of water rights, enacted after the same was barred by
the statute of limitations. The court predicated its conclusion not on
Campbell v. Holt, but on the theory that in construing the validity
of resurrectionary legislation there is a limited degree of latitude
within which common notions of justice must predominate as the
criterion. It subsequently adhered to this decision, where there was
not the excuse of a hard case, in another opinion wherein it upheld
a statute allowing a petition against a railroad company for the assess-
ment of damages in relation to raising the grade of a street, such
statute having been passed after the claim had been barred by the
limitation statute.29 In the still later case of Mulligan v. Hilton,30
the court discussed at some length the power of the legislature to re-
vive a cause of action barred by the limitation statute, laying down
the rules that where the time for prosecuting a cause of action is
fixed by contract, 3 ' or by a statute that made the limitation of time
inhere in the right rather than in the remedy,3 2 and whereby lapse of
time title passes to real or personal property,33 the bar cannot be
constitutionally divested by a statutory revival of the right of action.
The court then went on to say that as to the running of the statute
against a claim in personam, the legislature could constitutionally re-
vive such a claim, but such a power of revival must be exercised in
a restricted but not precisely delimited field. Thus, the statement by
Mr. Justice Holmes in the Groton Water Company case to the effect
that "... constitutional rules, like those of the common law, end in
a penumbra where the Legislature has a certain freedom in fixing the
26 To the effect that no one has a vested right in any given mode of pro-
cedure, see Note, 10 A. L. R. 2d 921 (1950), dealing with transfer of action to
another tribunal.
27 See 2 CARMODY ON PRACTIcE 662 (2d ed. 1932).
28 178 Mass. 472, 59 N. E. 1033 (1901).
29 Dunbar v. Boston and P. R. R., 181 Mass. 383, 63 N. E. 916 (1902).
30 305 Mass. 5, 24 N. E. 2d 676 (1940).
31 It would be well to note that according to the great weight of authority,
and as advocated in Campbell v. Holt, the statute of limitation does not inhere
in a contract made while the statute is in force.3 2 See also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930) ; Danzer and Co.
v. Gulf and Ship Island R. K, 268 U. S. 633 (1925).
33 Thus the court followed the distinction made in Campbell v. Holt.
1950 ]
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line .... ,3 4 was recognized as at least one criterion in denying or
affirming the validity of resurrectionary legislation. This one cri-
terion was adopted and advocated in the case of Robinson v. Robins
Dry Dock and Repair Company 35 which is the predominating case
on this subject in New York.
The New York Ruling
In the case of Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Company,3a the court
pointed out that the power to revive a right of action already barred
has been upheld in some, jurisdictions, denied or doubted in others,
while in this state there are conflicting dicta. Thus, in Hulbert v.
Clark '7 it was said, arguendo, that the statute does not, after the
passing of the prescribed period, discharge the debt, but simply bars
the remedy, and that the legislature may repeal the statute and re-
store the remedy. Subsequently, in a case where a claim was pre-
sented against a school district for the refunding of part of school
taxes, it was stated that since the defense of the statute of limitations
was not property it may be removed by legislative enactment.38
In the heretofore mentioned Robinson case,8 9 the plaintiff's in-
testate was killed while working as an employee of the defendant.
Plaintiff commenced a wrongful death action more than two years
after the intestate's death. The defense interposed was the statute
of limitations. 40 The plaintiff in reply pleaded that she had applied
for an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and had pro-
cured compensation until October 15, 1920, when the payment of
compensation was terminated by order of the commission after the
Supreme Court of the United States had rendered a decision 4' that
the New York Workmen's Compensation Act did not apply to a per-
son employed in maritime activity as was this plaintiff's intestate.
The lower court 42 granted defendant's motion for judgment on the
84 178 Mass. 472, 473, 59 N. E. 1033, 1034 (1901).
35238 N. Y. 271, 144 N. E. 579 (1924).
as 233 N. Y. 213, 135 N. E. 267 (1922). "The power thus to revive has
been upheld in some jurisdictions (Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). In others,
it has been denied or doubted (Board of Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 448;
Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 103 Wis. 373, 380; Danforth v. Groton Water
Co. 178 Mass. 472, 476, 478; Dunbar v. Boston & P. R_ R, 181 Mass. 383,
386 . In our own state there are conflicting dicta (Hulbert v. Clark, 128 N. Y.295; House v. Carr, 185 N. Y. 453. Contra: Germania Savings Bank v. Village
of Suspension Bridge, 159 N. Y. 362, 368)." Id. at 215, 139 N. E. at 267.
37 128 N. Y. 295, 28 N. E. 638 (1891).38 See People ex i:e. Eckerson v. Board of Education, 126 App. Div. 414,
421, 110 N. Y. Supp. 769, 774 (2d Dep't 1908).
39 See note 35 supra.
40 N. Y. Decedent Estate Law § 130 prescribes a period of two years from
the death of the decedent within which the wrongful death action must be
commenced.
41 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920).
42204 App. Div. 578, 198 N. Y. Supp. 99 (2d Dep't 1923).
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pleadings. Subsequent to the time this lower court passed on defen-
dant's motion, the legislature enacted Section 23-a to the Civil Prac-
tice Act 43 which was purposed to revive claims such as the plaintiff's.
The power to reinstate a right of action already barred was opposed
by the defendant, who asserted that such legislation constituted a
violation of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.
Lehman, J., in writing the opinion of the court relied principally
on the heretofore considered theory expounded by the tribunals of
the State of Massachusetts, but did not expressly reject the holding
of Campbell v. Holt. He recognized that there was, in construing
the validity of resurrectionary legislation, a certain indefinite area of
constitutional interpretation wherein the ultimate conclusion of the
court was to be premised on either the reasonableness or unreason-
ableness of the act in question. In observing that the plaintiff
promptly asserted the only remedy she possessed,44 and that she had
by unforeseen circumstances, through no fault of her own, been de-
prived of that remedy, 4" the court found sanction for the action of
the legislature. "Here is no arbitrary deprivation by the Legislature
of the rights of one party in order to confer a new right upon another
party. The Legislature originally gave this plaintiff a right of action
.... It imposed a bar after the expiration of a period of time during
which it was contemplated a plaintiff would have reasonable oppor-
tunity to enforce the right of action. The subsequent assertion of
power of the Legislature to give an alternative remedy 46... rendered
the plaintiff's apparently reasonable opportunity to bring an action
within the time limited almost illusory .... The extension of the time
to bring her action was reasonable and this exercise of the legislative
power should not be declared invalid because of a constitutional lim-
itation of doubtful application." 47 It would be well to note that in
concluding the court said, "We . . . do not decide that under any
other circumstances an attempted exercise of similar power would be
valid." 48
43 Laws of N. Y. 1923, c. 392, which extended to persons who, in reliance
upon an invalid statute affecting their rights under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, lost their right to sue for death of one upon whom they were de-
pendent, and gave those persons the right to thereafter commence such an ac-
tion at any time within one year after it went into effect. This was operative
to take from certain persons a complete defense which they might otherwise
have asserted to such an action.
44 N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 11 provides an exclusive remedy
for the employee against the employer; a common law action does not lie ex-
cept in certain cases not here applicable.
46The Supreme Court decision of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253
U. S. 149 (1920), precluded the plaintiff from obtaining the award she had
timely applied for and recovered.
48 The court referred to the exclusive remedy provided under N. Y. Work-
men's Compensation Law § 11.
'7238 N. Y. 271, 280, 144 N. E. 579, 582 (1924).
48 Ibid.
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The most recent exposition by the New York courts on this sub-
ject is contained in the case of Gallewski v. Hentz & Co. 49 Guttman,
a resident and citizen of the Netherlands, entered into an agreement
with the defendant, a New York brokerage firm, whereby defendant
agreed to buy and sell securities for Guttman "upon his instruction
and request." During May of 1940 the German army invaded and
occupied the Netherlands, and during this occupation Guttman was
arrested and deported to a concentration camp in Czechoslovakia.
In that same month the defendant, without authority, sold the major
portion of the securities held for Guttman's account and, out of the
proceeds of such sales, reduced Guttman's indebtedness to it. Gutt-
man's death was established by a court decree in the Netherlands
subsequent to the time that the German army was repulsed. In 1946
the plaintiff was appointed ancillary administrator by the Surrogate's
Court of New York County, and in March, 1948 (seven years and
ten months after the cause of action accrued) plaintiff sued to re-
cover the value of the securities unauthorizedly sold. The defendant
interposed the six-year statute of limitations. ° Pending appeal to
the Court of Appeals, Civil Practice Act Section 28-a 51 was enacted,
which expressly revived the plaintiff's cause of action. 52  The Court
acknowledged the fact that most states hold it beyond the power of
the legislature to revive causes of action after the limitation period
has expired, regardless of whether the claim was in personam or in
rem; but refused to expressly give sanction to that view or the prin-
49 301 N. Y. 164, 93 N. E. 2d 620 (1950).50 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 48.
51 Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 759. The text of the statute is as follows:
"1. If a person entitled to maintain an action, other than a person entitled
to the benefits of section twenty-seven, was a resident of or a sojourner in a for-
eign country with which the United States or any of its allies were at war during
the period beginning September first, nineteen hundred thirty-nine, and ending
August fourteenth, nineteen hundred forty-five, or any territory occupied by
the government of such foreign country, the period of such residence or sojourn
diwing which such foreign country was so at war with the United States or
any of its allies, or during which. such territory was so occupied, shall not be
a part of the time limited in this article for commencing the action, provided,
however, that the time limited for the commencement of such action shall not
hereby be extended for more than one year after the effective date of this
section.
"2. This act shall apply to actions heretofore accrued or hereafter accru-
ing and whether or not such actions have heretofore been barred by any statute
of limitations, provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall operate
to revive a cause of action heretofore barred where such revival would affect
an interest in property which has resulted from the expiration of the time
heretofore limited by law for the commencement of an action.
"3. This act shall take effect immediately." (Added provision in italics.)
52 N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 28-a, subd. 2, is somewhat confusing in one re-
spect. It purports to apply not only to actions heretofore accrued but also
to those "hereafter accruing." It is not understandable how the statute could
apply to actions "hereafter accruing" when it concerns only persons residing or
sojourning in an enemy country or enemy-occupied territory between Septem-
ber 1, 1939 and August 14, 1945.
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ciples recited in Campbell v. Holt.'3  Rather it predicated its decision
on the Robinson case and stated the hardship rule as contained there-
in: "... a revival statute is not necessarily and per se void as a
taking of 'property' without due process of law . . .the Legislature
may constitutionally revive a personal cause of action where the cir-
cumstances are exceptional and are such as to satisfy the court that
serious injustice would result to plaintiffs not guilty of any fault if
the intention of the Legislature were not effectuated .... The tests
suggested in the Robinson case (supra) leave the court free to ap-
proach each revival statute on its individual merits, in the light of its
own peculiar circumstances and setting." 54 It was then concluded
that the unparalleled upheaval of World War II 5 so completely dis-
rupted communications, that residents of occupied territories were
completely incapacitated from pursuing and effectuating their rights
in the courts of this state. 3 And that this was a case ". . . where
both instinct and reason revolt at the proposition that redress for a
wrong must be denied because the Legislature may not remove a
statutory bar which has conferred an immunity which is contrary to
all prevailing ideas of justice." 57 Thus the constitutionality of resur-
rectionary legislation was again upheld in this state, but with the
admonition that it was unnecessary to determine the validity of
Section 28-a under diverse circumstances.
The Conclusion
It may be said that there exist three separate opinions on the
validity of legislation which purports to revive a claim barred by the
statute of limitations.
53 115 U. S. 620 (1885). The proviso at the end of Section 28-a, subd. 2,
of the bill was apparently included to conform with the distinction made in
Campbell v. Holt between the constitutionality of statutes relating to personal
causes of action and causes of action affecting an interest in property.
54301 N. Y. 164, 174, 93 N. E. 2d 620, 624 (1950).
55 THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEWv YORK, THE COMMIT-
TEE ON STATE LEGISLAToN, BULLETIN #6 (1950), at 273, 274, declared, "The
bill seems reasonable and desirable. The conditions of global warfare experi-
enced in World War II found many persons who were not enemies of the
United States ... residing ...in enemy countries or territory occupied by
them ... many of these people were unable to ... prosecute suits within the
prevailing time limitations because they were . . .sojourning in enemy occu-
pied territory . . .some of them were sent to concentration camps. This bill
appears to be designed to assure a reasonable opportunity for the commence-
ment of actions on claims those people had which might otherwise be barred
by the existing statute of limitations. The purpose of the bill, therefore,
appears to be laudable."
56 Pendency of a state of war constitutes a disability to suitors who are citi-
zens or subjects of hostile powers. Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns. 210 (N. Y.
1818).
57 Gallewski v. Hentz & Co., 301 N. Y. 164, 174, 93 N. E. 2d 620, 624,
quoting from the Robinson case, note 47 supra.
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1. There is the majority rule which asserts that once the de-
fense of the statute of limitations has vested, it can never be denied
effect. The rationale of this theory is the principle that the statute
of limitations is a rule of property, and once vested, it creates a valu-
able right, the infringement of which is prohibited by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.58
2. There is the Supreme Court view which draws a distinction
between a statutory. bar operating to invest persons with title to
property and a bar which constitutes merely a defense to a personal
demand. That distinction is predicated on the effect a statute of
limitation has on the interest involved. If it effects a transfer of
title to real or personal property, no subsequent legislative enactment
can divest that title. If the effect is merely to suspend the remedy,
as in claims other than those involving tangible property, all legis-
lative enactments reinstating that remedy are constitutional, and this
because that bar is not a valuable property interest within the con-
notation of the Federal Constitution.
3. There is the New York view which conditions the consti-
tutionality of resurrectionary legislation on the hardship which would
be imposed on the plaintiff were the statute denied judicial approval.
In taking cognizance of the fact that the in personam effect of lim-
itation statutes do not operate on the right, but merely on the remedy,
and in supposing a penumbra of constitutional interpretation wherein
no static rules are relevant, but rather wherein circumstances in their
varying forms must be utilized in determining the reasonableness of
statutory enactments, it is submitted that the New York rationale is
a great deal more sound than the previous two theories. 9
58 For collection of cases, see Notes, 133 A. L. R_ 384 (1941), 36 A. L. R.
1316 (1925).59 THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRK, THE COMMIT-
TEE ON STATE LEGIsLATIoN, BULLETIN #6 (1950), at 275, 276, declared, "In
New York, the extent of the power to revive a cause of action barred by the
statute of limitations is not entirely clear, and revival is an extreme exercise
of the legislative power . . . . There are . . . cases . . . which indicate the
legislature has certain latitude in dealing with the statute of limitation where
there appears to be a moral obligation to do so, the seeming infraction of right
is not very great and justice requires relief."
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